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Abstract
In this paper we provide a proof of unconditional security for a semi-
quantum key distribution protocol introduced in a previous work. This
particular protocol demonstrated the possibility of using X basis states
to contribute to the raw key of the two users (as opposed to using only
direct measurement results) even though a semi-quantum participant can-
not directly manipulate such states. In this work we provide a complete
proof of security by deriving a lower bound of the protocol’s key rate in
the asymptotic scenario. Using this bound we are able to find an error
threshold value such that for all error rates less than this threshold, it is
guaranteed that A and B may distill a secure secret key; for error rates
larger than this threshold, A and B should abort. We demonstrate that
this error threshold compares favorably to several fully quantum protocols.
We also comment on some interesting observations about the behavior of
this protocol under certain noise scenarios.
1 Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols allow two users: Alice (A) and
Bob (B) to establish a secret key in the presence of an all powerful adversary.
Since the original BB84 protocol [1], several protocols have been developed
including B92 [2], SARG04 [3], three state BB84 [4], and many others (see [5]
for a general survey). These protocols, however, assume that A and B are both
able to perform certain quantum operations (e.g., prepare and measure qubits
in a variety of bases).
Semi-Quantum Key Distribution (SQKD) protocols, first introduced in 2007
[6], attempt to achieve the same end (establishment of a secret key secure against
an all powerful adversary), when one of the two users (typically B) is limited
or “classical” in nature (what is meant by this shall be discussed momentarily).
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Since their creation, several SQKD protocols have been proposed [7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13].
A SQKD protocol typically operates by having the quantum user A send a
qubit prepared in an arbitrary basis. The qubit travels to the classical user B
who is limited to performing one of two operations:
1. He may measure and resend the qubit; measuring only in the computa-
tional Z = {|0〉 , |1〉} basis and resending his result to A. That is, if he
measures |r〉 (r ∈ {0, 1}), then he will send a qubit |r〉 to A.
2. He may reflect the qubit; the qubit then passes through B’s lab undis-
turbed and returns to A. B learns nothing of its state in this case.
Regardless of B’s choice, a qubit returns to A who is then free to perform any
quantum operation on it (e.g., measure in an arbitrary basis).
Due to the reliance on a two-way quantum communication channel (one
which permits a qubit to travel from A to B and then return from B to A),
the security analysis of SQKD protocols has been limited due to the fact that
the attacker Eve (E) is now allowed two opportunities to attack the qubit,
thus greatly increasing the complexity of the security analysis. For this reason,
most security proofs for SQKD protocols have been limited to the notion of
robustness. This concept, introduced in [6] defines a protocol as robust if for
any attack which allows E to gain information on A or B’s key with non-zero
probability, must necessarily induce a disturbance which may be detected by
either A or B with non-zero probability. Nothing, however, is said about the
relationship between the noise in E’s attack and the information gained.
Recently, however, the state of this situation has been improving. In [14,
15], a relationship was derived between the probability of disturbance and the
amount of information gained by E assuming the latter is limited to perform-
ing individual attacks (attacks where E will perform the same operation each
iteration of the protocol and will measure her ancilla before A and B use their
key for any purpose). Recently, we have managed to prove the unconditional
security (making no assumptions on the type of attack employed by E) of sev-
eral SQKD protocols by devising several different proof techniques for handling
the complexity caused by the two-way quantum channel [13, 16]. These tech-
niques are also used to devise lower bounds on the key rate expression in the
asymptotic scenario (to be defined shortly) for several protocols, namely Boyer
et al.’s original protocol [6], the single-state SQKD protocol introduced in [10],
and the mediated SQKD protocol introduced in [13].
In [12], we introduced a new semi-quantum key distribution protocol which
was the first to permit reflections (and thus X basis states) to contribute towards
the raw key (note that classical B cannot directly manipulate X-basis states).
However, in that paper we proved only its robustness - that is, we showed if an
attacker gained information on the raw key, she could be detected with non-zero
probability. While at the time robustness was the primary definition of security
for semi-quantum protocols, lately, however, this has not been the case. In [17],
we provided a proof of its unconditional security by comparing it to the B92 [2]
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protocol; however, that proof technique led to very pessimistic noise tolerance
levels along with an extreme sensitivity to the noise in the forward channel. In
this paper we revisit our protocol and use the technique developed in [16] (where
we proved the security of Boyer et al.’s original SQKD protocol) to prove its
security. To do so, we will also utilize the notion of restricted collective attacks
developed in [12] along with a suitable adaptation of the proof mechanism used
in [16]. This new proof provides a far more optimistic bound on its key rate
and noise tolerance levels.
Our proof in this paper involves only the perfect qubit scenario. We do not
consider such attacks as multi-photon attacks for instance. This is reasonable:
indeed, security proofs for fully quantum protocols began by considering per-
fect qubit sources and only later began to analyze implementation issues. In
the future, analyzing more practical implementations, and security against the
attacks (and potential remedies) mentioned in [18, 19] will become more impor-
tant. However, we feel that the work presented in this paper and in others, in
developing the techniques to prove these protocols secure, will be useful, not
only in this semi-quantum setting, but also in analyzing other quantum proto-
cols, semi or otherwise, requiring the use of a two-way quantum communication
channel. The analytical techniques developed and applied here may find broader
application beyond the realm of semi-quantum and towards fully quantum pro-
tocols relying on a two-way channel. They may also be helpful when considering
security beyond the perfect qubit scenario.
1.1 The Protocol
The protocol we consider is exactly the one described in [12] with only one small
modification mentioned later. This protocol, besides being semi-quantum (i.e,
one of the users - B in this case - is limited to measuring and resending in the Z
basis or reflecting qubits) is also a single-state protocol. These protocols, first
introduced in [10], place a further restriction on the quantum user A: namely,
A must send a single, publicly known, qubit state each iteration.
The quantum communication stage of the protocol is as follows:
1. A sends the state |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉).
2. B will choose a random value kB ∈ {0, 1} to be his candidate raw key bit
for this iteration.
• If kB = 0 (with probability 1/2), B will reflect the qubit.
• If kB = 1 he will measure and resend the qubit (i.e., he will measure
in the Z basis, receive outcome |r〉 for r ∈ {0, 1} and send the qubit
|r〉 to A). He saves his measurement result as mB (i.e., mB = r).
3. A now chooses to measure in the Z or X basis (the X basis consists of
those states |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉)).
• If she chose the X basis (with probability 1/2), and her measurement
result is |−〉, she sets her raw key bit to be kA = 1
3
• If she chose the Z basis and her measurement result is |1〉 she sets
kA = 0.
• Otherwise she sets kA = −1.
After running the above process N times, for N sufficiently large, A and
B will use the public authenticated channel to discard certain iterations. B
will tell A to discard all iterations where he measured |1〉. B will next choose
a suitable proportion of randomly chosen iterations where kB = 0 (i.e., those
iterations he reflected) and discard them so that the probability that kB = 0 is
equal to the probability that kB = 1. This is done to “balance” his key (in the
absence of any noise, he will discard half of the iterations he reflected - this is
due to the fact that he discarded half of the iterations he measured due to him
measuring |1〉; however E’s attack may “bias” his measurement results). It is
the only step we added from our original protocol in [12] - it is not necessary, but
it does simplify the algebra in our proof. Note that our analysis could still be
carried out without this step - it is purely for algebraic simplification purposes.
Finally, A will tell B to discard all iterations where kA = −1 (i.e., all iterations
where she measured |0〉 or |+〉).
Note it is easy to see the protocol is correct. That is, in the absence of
noise, conditioning on the event that B does not discard the iteration, the qubit
leaving his lab is |+〉 (if kB = 0) or |0〉 (if kB = 1). Thus, if A measures |−〉
it must be that B set kB = 1 (if he reflects, A should always measure |+〉);
otherwise if she measures |1〉 it must be that B reflected (i.e., kB = 0). The
observant reader will note the similarities between this protocol and the B92 [2]
protocol - a similarity first commented on in [17]. Indeed, while Boyer et al.’s
original SQKD protocol in [6] is often considered the semi-quantum version of
BB84, our protocol may be considered the semi-quantum version of B92.
2 Security Proof
We will first assume E is limited to performing collective attacks. These are
attacks where E performs the same operation each iteration of the protocol
but is free to postpone the measurement of her ancilla until any future time
of her choosing (this is in contrast to individual attacks where she is forced to
measure her ancilla immediately). After proving security in this case, we will
show security against general attacks - attacks where there are no restrictions
placed on E other than those imposed by the laws of physics.
Following the completion of N “successful” iterations of the protocol (i.e.,
those iterations that are not discarded) and, assuming collective attacks, the
state of the joint quantum system ρABE (a density operator acting on A, B,
and E’s Hilbert spaces - all of which, without loss of generality, are assumed
to be finite dimensional) is of the form ρABE = σ
⊗N
ABE , where σABE models the
joint system after one iteration. Following the quantum communication stage, A
and B will run an error correcting protocol and a privacy amplification protocol
(see [5] for these standard processes) which will result in a secret key of size
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`(N) ≤ N (possibly `(N) = 0 if E has too much information). Given this, it
was shown in [20, 21, 22] that the key rate in the asymptotic scenario, denoted
r, is:
r = lim
N→∞
`(N)
N
= inf(S(B|E)−H(B|A)), (1)
where S(B|E) is the conditional von Neumann entropy of B’s system condi-
tioned on E (defined S(B|E) = S(BE)− S(E) where S(·) is the von Neumann
entropy) while H(B|A) is the classical conditional entropy of B’s system condi-
tioned on A. The infimum is over all collective attacks which induce the observed
statistics (e.g., which induce the observed error rate). This expression is rather
intuitive: it states that the key rate is the difference between E’s uncertainty
on B’s raw key (which should be high) and A’s uncertainty of B’s key (which
should be low). The infimum is required since there are infinitely many attacks
which induce a certain error rate and we must assume that E chooses the one
which increases her information. Note that we are using reverse reconciliation
[5] here which, as commented in [16], seems the more natural choice for these
two-way semi-quantum protocols. An open question remains to bound the key
rate using direct reconciliation (there we have S(A|E)−H(A|B)).
In this paper, we will find a lower bound on this value r. Our bound will be
a function of certain parameters that may be estimated by A and B.
2.1 Modeling the Protocol
To compute a bound on the key rate, we must first describe the quantum system
after one successful iteration of the protocol. Successful, here, meaning that A
and B use this iteration to contribute towards their raw key (i.e., neither A nor
B discard the iteration). In particular, one of the following events occur:
1. B reflects (and does not later discard - recall he will choose a suitable
portion of reflections and discard them so as to balance his raw key prior
to A’s acceptance) and A measures |1〉.
2. B measures and resends |0〉 and A measures |−〉.
In [12], we showed that, for any single-state semi-quantum protocol (i.e., a
protocol where A sends the same qubit state each iteration and this state is
public knowledge), and any collective attack (UF , UR) (where UF is the unitary
attack operator used by E in the forward direction, while UR is the operator used
in the reverse channel), there exists an equivalent restricted collective attack of
the form (b, U) where b ∈ [−1/2, 1/2]) and U is a unitary operator acting on
the qubit and E’s private quantum memory. This attack works as follows:
1. First, E will capture the qubit sent from A. Since it is always the same
state, we have E discard the qubit and prepare one of her own in the form:
|e〉 =
√
1
2
+ b |0〉+
√
1
2
− b |1〉 .
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She then sends this qubit |e〉 to B (observe it is not entangled with her
private quantum memory at this point).
2. AfterB’s operation, the qubit returns toA; E will first capture it, however,
and probe it using unitary operator U acting on the qubit and entangling
it with her private quantum memory. The qubit is then forwarded to A.
It was proven that the resulting density operator under attack (UF , UR) is
equal to the density operator if attack (b, U) is employed; thus, as far as A, B,
or E is concerned the two attacks are equivalent. Furthermore, the resulting
key rate expression is exactly the same in either case. Thus, to prove security
against collective attacks, it suffices to prove security agains these restricted
attacks. Later, we will prove security against general attacks.
Fix a restricted collective attack (b, U). We will assume that b ∈ (−1/2, 1/2)
(i.e. it is not equal to the extremes of ±1/2). As we will see later, b contributes
to the error rate of the protocol and if b is too far from zero, the noise level is
too high anyway so A and B should abort (note that b is a parameter that A
and B may estimate).
Due to the fact that B will reject a suitable number of iterations when he
reflects so as to balance the probability that, prior to A’s acceptance his raw
key is 0 or 1, we may write the state of the system, following B’s operation, and
conditioning on his acceptance, as follows:
ρ =
1
2
|0〉 〈0|B ⊗ |e〉 〈e|T +
1
2
|1〉 〈1|B ⊗ |0〉 〈0|T ,
where |e〉+√1/2 + b |0〉+√1/2− b |1〉, is the qubit sent from E in the forward
channel. Of course B can only know how many reflection iterations to discard
after estimating b; thus he rejects these iterations after the quantum communi-
cation stage of the protocol. However, whether we condition on this event now
or later makes no difference to the resulting density operator. Conditioning on
it now, however, does simplify the following algebra.
The transit qubit then returns, from B, to A, but it is first intercepted by E
who will probe the qubit using unitary operator U . This operator, which acts
on HT ⊗HE , acts on basis states as follows:
U |0〉 = |0, e0〉+ |1, e1〉
U |1〉 = |0, e2〉+ |1, e3〉
U |+〉 = |+, f0〉+ |−, f1〉
U |−〉 = |+, f2〉+ |−, f3〉 .
Here, the |ei〉 are arbitrary, not necessarily normalized, nor orthogonal, states
in HE . The |fi〉 are states in HE which depend linearly on the |ei〉 states. In
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particular, we have:
|f0〉 = 1
2
(|e0〉+ |e1〉+ |e2〉+ |e3〉) (2)
|f1〉 = 1
2
(|e0〉 − |e1〉+ |e2〉 − |e3〉)
|f2〉 = 1
2
(|e0〉+ |e1〉 − |e2〉 − |e3〉)
|f3〉 = 1
2
(|e0〉 − |e1〉 − |e2〉+ |e3〉)
Naturally, unitarity of U imposes certain conditions on these states, namely:
〈e0|e0〉+ 〈e1|e1〉 = 〈e2|e2〉+ 〈e3|e3〉 = 1 (3)
〈e0|e2〉+ 〈e1|e3〉 = 0.
These conditions will be important later.
Changing basis, we may write |e〉 = α |+〉+ β |−〉, where:
α =
1√
2
(√
1
2
+ b+
√
1
2
− b
)
(4)
β =
1√
2
(√
1
2
+ b−
√
1
2
− b
)
Thus, by the linearity of U , we have:
U |e〉 = |+, g0〉+ |−, g1〉 ,
where:
|g0〉 = α |f0〉+ β |f2〉 (5)
|g1〉 = α |f1〉+ β |f3〉 .
Since it will be useful later, we will also write |g1〉 in terms of the |ei〉 states.
Let X =
√
1/2 + b and Y =
√
1/2− b. Then:
|g1〉 = α |f1〉+ β |f3〉 = 1
2
([α+ β] |e0〉 − [α+ β] |e1〉+ [α− β] |e2〉 − [α− β] |e3〉)
=
1
2
(
√
2X |e0〉 −
√
2X |e1〉+
√
2Y |e2〉 −
√
2Y |e3〉)
=
1√
2
(X |e0〉 −X |e1〉+ Y |e2〉 − Y |e3〉). (6)
Observe that if b = 0 we have |g1〉 = |f1〉 as expected.
Thus, after E’s attack, the system evolves to:
ρ =
1
2
|0〉 〈0|B ⊗ P (|+, g0〉+ |−, g1〉) +
1
2
|1〉 〈1|B ⊗ P (|0, e0〉+ |1, e1〉),
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where P (z) = zz∗ and z∗ represents the conjugate transpose of z.
A will then receive the transit qubit and perform a measurement in either the
Z or X basis. She will accept only if she measures a |1〉 or a |−〉. Thus, condi-
tioning on her acceptance, the system becomes, disregarding the normalization
term:
σ = |0〉 〈0|A ⊗
(
1
2
|0〉 〈0|B ⊗
1
2
P (|g0〉 − |g1〉) + 1
2
|1〉 〈1|B ⊗ |e1〉 〈e1|
)
+ |1〉 〈1|A ⊗
(
1
2
|0〉 〈0|B ⊗ |g1〉 〈g1|+
1
2
|1〉 〈1|B ⊗
1
2
P (|e0〉 − |e1〉)
)
.
Rearranging terms, and now inserting the normalization term N = trσ,
yields the final system:
ρABE =
1
N
[
1
2
|00〉 〈00|AB ⊗
1
2
P (|g0〉 − |g1〉) + 1
2
|01〉 〈01|AB ⊗ |e1〉 〈e1| (7)
+
1
2
|10〉 〈10|AB ⊗ |g1〉 〈g1|+
1
2
|11〉 〈11|AB ⊗
1
2
P (|e0〉 − |e1〉)
]
.
Let qi,j be defined as follows:
q0,0 =
1
4
trP (|g0〉 − |g1〉) = 1
4
(1− 2Re 〈g0|g1〉) (8)
q1,1 =
1
4
trP (|e0〉 − |e1〉) = 1
4
(1− 2Re 〈e0|e1〉)
q0,1 =
1
2
〈e1|e1〉 = 1
2
QZ
q1,0 =
1
2
〈g1|g1〉 = 1
2
Qe,
where QZ is the probability that a |0〉 flips to a |1〉 while Qe = | 〈−|U |e〉 |2 is
the probability that, if B reflects and if A measures in the X basis, that she
measures |−〉. Notice that, when b = 0, then |e〉 = |+〉 and so Qe in that case
is the error rate in the X basis. Of course the bias term affects this error rate
and to stress that fact, we write Qe instead of QX .
With these definitions, clearly:
N =
∑
i,j
qi,j . (9)
Let pi,j be the probability that A and B’s raw key bit is i and j respectively,
conditioning on the event that A and B accept. These values are obviously:
pi,j =
qi,j
N
(10)
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2.2 Bounding the von Neumann Entropy
We will now compute a lower-bound on the key rate of this protocol. Tracing
out A’s system yields:
ρBE =
1
N
[
1
2
|0〉 〈0|B ⊗
(
1
2
P (|g0〉 − |g1〉) + |g1〉 〈g1|
)
+
1
2
|1〉 〈1|B ⊗
(
1
2
P (|e0〉 − |e1〉) + |e1〉 〈e1|
)]
.
Computing the von Neumann entropy of such a state is a difficult task. To
simplify the system, we will use a technique, inspired from [23] and also used
in [16] to prove the security of Boyer et al.,’s [6] SQKD protocol. That is,
we will condition on a new random variable C. Note that, due to the strong
sub additivity of von Neumann entropy, for any tripartite system, it holds that
S(B|E) ≥ S(B|EC). Thus, if we condition on a new system C, we will derive
a lower-bound on the key rate equation 1. By careful choice of C we will also
simplify the entropy computation.
Our system C will be two-dimensional, spanned by the orthonormal basis
{|C〉 , |W 〉}. Here, |C〉 〈C| will be the event that A and B’s raw key bits match
(i.e., they are Correct), while |W 〉 〈W | will describe the event that A and B’s
raw key bits are Wrong.
Conditioning on this new system yields the mixed state:
ρBEC =
1
N
[
1
2
|0〉 〈0|B ⊗
(
|C〉 〈C| ⊗ 1
2
P (|g0〉 − |g1〉) + |W 〉 〈W | ⊗ |g1〉 〈g1|
)
+
1
2
|1〉 〈1|B ⊗
(
|C〉 〈C| ⊗ 1
2
P (|e0〉 − |e1〉) + |W 〉 〈W | ⊗ |e1〉 〈e1|
)]
.
Choosing a suitable basis, we may write ρBEC as a diagonal matrix with
diagonal elements of the form pi,j . Thus, we readily compute:
S(BEC) = H(p0,0, p0,1, p1,0, p1,1) = H
(
{pi,j}i,j
)
, (11)
where H(·) is the Shannon entropy function.
We must now find an upper-bound on the quantity S(EC) (thus providing
us with a lower bound on S(B|EC) = S(BEC)−S(EC)). Tracing out B yields:
ρEC =
1
N
[
|C〉 〈C| ⊗ 1
4
(P (|g0〉 − |g1〉) + P (|e0〉 − |e1〉)) (12)
+ |W 〉 〈W | ⊗ 1
2
(|g1〉 〈g1|+ |e1〉 〈e1|)
]
.
Assume for now that q0,1 and q1,0 are both positive (q0,0 and q1,1 should
both be positive, else there is too much noise and A and B should abort). After
some algebraic manipulation, we can rewrite the above density operator in the
form:
ρEC = (p0,0 + p1,1) |C〉 〈C| ⊗ σC + (p0,1 + p1,0) |W 〉 〈W | ⊗ σW , (13)
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where:
σC =
P (|g0〉 − |g1〉) + P (|e0〉 − |e1〉)
4(q0,0 + q1,1)
σw =
|g1〉 〈g1|+ |e1〉 〈e1|
2(q0,1 + q1,0)
.
Observe that both σC and σW are Hermitian positive semi-definite operators of
unit trace.
For states of this form, it is easy to show (see [16] for a proof), that:
S(EC) = h(p0,0 + p1,1) + (p0,1 + p1,0)S(σW ) + (p0,0 + p1,1)S(σC)
≤ h(p0,0 + p1,1) + p0,1 + p1,0 + (p0,0 + p1,1)S(σC),
where h(x) is the binary entropy function (e.g., h(x) = H(x, 1− x)), and where
the inequality follows from the fact that, since σW is two-dimensional, S(σW ) ≤
1.
If the error rate is small, it is expected that p0,1 and p1,0 are also small (note
that if both are zero, it is easy to show that |g1〉 ≡ |e1〉 ≡ 0; thus they never
appear in Equation 12 and the bound above applies even in this case). However
p0,0 and p1,1 should be large thus we must find an upper-bound on S(σC).
Let |h0〉 = |g0〉 − |g1〉 and |h1〉 = |e0〉 − |e1〉. Then q0,0 = 〈h0|h0〉 /4 and
q1,1 = 〈h1|h1〉 /4 and:
σC =
|h0〉 〈h0|+ |h1〉 〈h1|
〈h0|h0〉+ 〈h1|h1〉 .
We may write, without loss of generality, |h0〉 = x |h〉 and |h1〉 = y |h〉+z |ζ〉,
where x, y, z ∈ C, 〈h|h〉 = 〈ζ|ζ〉 = 1 and 〈h|ζ〉 = 0. This implies:
|x|2 = 〈h0|h0〉 = 4q0,0 (14)
|y|2 + |z|2 = 〈h1|h1〉 = 4q1,1 (15)
x∗y = 〈h0|h1〉 =⇒ |y|2 = | 〈h0|h1〉 |
2
|x|2 (16)
In this {|h〉 , |ζ〉} basis, we may write σC as:
σC =
1
|x|2 + |y|2 + |z|2
 |x|2 + |y|2 , yz∗
y∗z , |z|2
 ,
the eigenvalues of which are:
λ± =
1
2
±
√
(|x|2 + |y|2 − |z|2)2 + 4|y|2|z|2
2(|x|2 + |y|2 + |z|2)
=
1
2
±
√
(|x|2 + 2|y|2 − 4q1,1)2 + 4|y|2(4q1,1 − |y|2)
2(|x|2 + |y|2 + |z|2) ,
10
where, above, we used the fact that |y|2+|z|2 = 4q1,1. Now, let ∆ = 4q0,0−4q1,1
and, recalling that |x|2 = 4q0,0, we continue:
λ± =
1
2
±
√
(∆ + 2|y|2)2 + 16|y|2q1,1 − 4|y|4
2(|x|2 + |y|2 + |z|2)
=
1
2
±
√
∆2 + 4|y|2∆ + 16|y|2q1,1
2(|x|2 + |y|2 + |z|2)
=
1
2
±
√
∆2 + 4|y|2(∆ + 4q1,1)
2(|x|2 + |y|2 + |z|2) =
1
2
±
√
∆2 + 4|y|2(4q0,0)
8(q0,0 + q1,1)
.
Recalling that |y|2 = | 〈h0|h1〉 |2/|x|2 = | 〈h0|h1〉 |2/(4q0,0), yields:
λ± =
1
2
±
√
∆2 + 4| 〈h0|h1〉 |2
8(q0,0 + q1,1)
=
1
2
±
√
4(q0,0 − q1,1)2 + | 〈h0|h1〉 |2
4(q0,0 + q1,1)
. (17)
Thus, we have:
S(EC) ≤ h(p0,0 + p1,1) + p0,1 + p1,0 + (p0,0 + p1,1)h (λ+) .
This is a quantity which depends on the values pi,j , which may be directly
observed by A and B, and also | 〈h0|h1〉 |2, a quantity which, though not directly
observable, can be bounded as we will soon demonstrate.
Note that λ+ ≥ 1/2 and that h(x) attains its maximum when x = 1/2. Also
observe that, as | 〈h0|h1〉 |2 ≥ 0 increases, λ+ increases, thus decreasing h(λ+).
Therefore, if we find a lower bound B such that:
| 〈h0|h1〉 |2 ≥ B,
and define:
λ =
1
2
+
√
4(q0,0 − q1,1)2 + B
4(q0,0 + q1,1)
, (18)
then 12 ≤ λ ≤ λ+ which implies h(λ) ≥ h(λ+) and so:
S(EC) ≤ h(p0,0 + p1,1) + p0,1 + p1,0 + (p0,0 + p1,1)h (λ) .
Thus, our key rate bound becomes:
r ≥ H ({pi,j}i,j)−h(p0,0 +p1,1)−p0,1−p1,0− (p0,0 +p1,1)h(λ)−H(B|A). (19)
2.3 Final Key Rate Bound
Computing H(B|A) is trivial. Indeed, H(B|A) = H(BA)−H(A). From Equa-
tion 7, it is easy to see that H(BA) = H({pi,j}i,j). H(A) is simply h(p0,0+p0,1).
Thus our key rate bound becomes:
r ≥ h(p0,0 + p0,1)− h(p0,0 + p1,1)− p0,1 − p1,0 − (p0,0 + p1,1)h(λ). (20)
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This is an equation which, with the exception of B, depends only on pa-
rameters that A and B may estimate. Determining a value for B may be done
by considering certain other observable statistics as we demonstrate in the next
section.
2.4 Bounding | 〈h0|h1〉 |2 Using Certain Observable Statis-
tics
Our goal is to bound | 〈h0|h1〉 |2 = | 〈h1|h0〉 |2 (i.e., determine a value for B
needed for evaluating Equation 18 which appears in our key rate bound in
Equation 20). While | 〈h0|h1〉 |2 cannot be observed directly, it may be bounded
using only statistics that are directly observable by quantum A and classical B.
Recall |h0〉 = |g0〉 − |g1〉 and |h1〉 = |e0〉 − |e1〉. From Equations 2 and 5, we
have:
|h0〉 = |g0〉 − |g1〉 = α(|f0〉 − |f1〉) + β(|f2〉 − |f3〉)
= α(|e1〉+ |e3〉) + β(|e1〉 − |e3〉),
where α and β are defined in Equation 4.
Let X =
√
1/2 + b and Y =
√
1/2− b. Then, writing α = 1√
2
(X + Y ) and
β = 1√
2
(X − Y ), we have:
|h0〉 = 1√
2
X(2 |e1〉) + 1√
2
Y (2 |e3〉) =
√
2X |e1〉+
√
2Y |e3〉
=
√
1 + 2b |e1〉+
√
1− 2b |e3〉
= γ |e1〉+ δ |e3〉 ,
where we have defined γ =
√
1 + 2b and δ =
√
1− 2b.
In this new notation, we have:
〈h1|h0〉 = γ 〈e0|e1〉 − γ 〈e1|e1〉+ δ 〈e0|e3〉 − δ 〈e1|e3〉 .
(Note that the order of the h states in the above - i.e., 〈h1|h0〉 instead of 〈h0|h1〉
- is not a typo.)
Clearly, Alice and Bob may estimate 〈e1|e1〉: it is simply the probability
that, if B sends a |0〉 (i.e., he measures and resends a |0〉), then A measures |1〉.
Call this quantity QZ : it is the error rate in the Z basis. We will make the usual
assumption in QKD security proofs that the error in the Z basis is symmetrical
in that QZ = 〈e1|e1〉 = 〈e2|e2〉 (since 〈e2|e2〉 is also observable, this assumption
could even be enforced); our analysis in the following section, however, may be
carried out without this assumption.
Now consider:
Re 〈h1|h0〉 = γRe 〈e0|e1〉 − γQZ + δRe 〈e0|e3〉 − δRe 〈e1|e3〉 , (21)
where Re(z) denotes the real part of z. If we can find a value η ≥ 0 such that
Re 〈h1|h0〉 ≥ η ≥ 0, it will follow that:
| 〈h0|h1〉 |2 = | 〈h1|h0〉 |2 = Re2 〈h1|h0〉+ Im2 〈h1|h0〉 ≥ Re2 〈h1|h0〉 ≥ η2,
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where Im(z) denotes the imaginary part of z. Of course if η is negative the above
cannot be used; however, we will show, if the noise in the channel is low enough,
η is also large positive. Thus, finding a positive lower bound for Equation 21
is our new goal. To do so, A and B will use mismatched measurement results
- a technique which will allow them to observe quantities such as Re 〈e0|e1〉 by
using those iterations where A measures in the “wrong” basis (e.g., they will
use the probability that A measures |+〉 if B sent |0〉). Using mismatched bases
to estimate the quantum channel in quantum key distribution is not a new idea
(see, for instance, [24]).
Observe that, if B sends |0〉 then, after E’s attack operator U , the state
when the qubit arrives at A is:
U |0〉 = |0, e0〉+ |1, e1〉 = 1√
2
|+〉 (|e0〉+ |e1〉) + 1√
2
|−〉 (|e0〉 − |e1〉).
If A measures in the X basis, she observes |+〉 with probability:
p0+ =
1
2
(1 + 2Re 〈e0|e1〉),
thus providing her with an estimate of Re 〈e0|e1〉. Note that, for notation, we
will write pi,j to mean the probability that A measures j if B sends i. These
are not to be confused with Equation 10; and indeed, they cannot be since the
p·,· values we consider in this section will always be “mismatched” (one of i or
j will be a Z state while the other will be a non Z state).
To estimate Re 〈e1|e3〉, we can use the probability that A measures |1〉 if
B reflects. Recall, the state arriving at B’s lab is |e〉 = X |0〉 + Y |1〉 (where
X =
√
1/2 + b and Y =
√
1/2− b). After E’s attack operator in the return
channel (assuming B reflected), the state evolves to:
U |e〉 = X(|0, e0〉+|1, e1〉)+Y (|0, e2〉+|1, e3〉) = |0〉 (X |e0〉+Y |e2〉)+|1〉 (X |e1〉+Y |e3〉).
Thus pe1 - the probability that A measures |1〉 if B “sends” |e〉 (i.e., reflects) -
is:
pe1 = X
2 〈e1|e1〉+ Y 2 〈e3|e3〉+ 2XY Re 〈e1|e3〉
= X2QZ + (1−QZ)Y 2 + 2XY Re 〈e1|e3〉
=
(
1
2
+ b
)
QZ +
(
1
2
− b
)
(1−QZ) + 2
√
1
4
− b2Re 〈e1|e3〉
=
1
2
− b(1− 2QZ) + 2
√
1
4
− b2Re 〈e1|e3〉 .
(Note that if b = 0 and QZ = 0 - i.e, there is no error in either direction of the
channel - then pe1 = p+1 = 1/2 as expected.)
Since b and QZ are parameters that may be estimated by A and B, this
value pe1 provides them with an estimate of Re 〈e1|e3〉.
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Finally, for Re 〈e0|e3〉, we consider the probability that A measures |−〉 if B
reflects (note this should be small if the noise is small). Using Equation 6, this
value is found to be:
pe− = Qe = 〈g1|g1〉 = 1
2
(
X2 〈e0|e0〉+X2 〈e1|e1〉+ Y 2 〈e2|e2〉+ Y 2 〈e3|e3〉
−2Re [X2 〈e0|e1〉+XY 〈e0|e3〉+XY 〈e1|e2〉+ Y 2 〈e2|e3〉]) .
=
1
2
−Re (X2 〈e0|e1〉+XY 〈e0|e3〉+XY 〈e1|e2〉+ Y 2 〈e2|e3〉) (22)
Above, we used Equation 3 to make certain cancelations.
Note that Re 〈e2|e3〉 may be estimated in a similar manner as was Re 〈e0|e1〉,
namely by using the value p1+. Re 〈e1|e2〉 may be bounded using the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality: | 〈e1|e2〉 | ≤
√〈e1|e1〉 〈e2|e2〉 = √Q2Z = QZ . Thus:
Re 〈e1|e2〉 ≤
√
Re2 〈e1|e2〉 ≤ | 〈e1|e2〉 | ≤ QZ .
This provides A and B with a bound on the quantity Re 〈e0|e3〉. We now
have everything necessary to find a lower bound η such that Re 〈h1|h0〉 ≥ η. In
particular, η may be found using the (observable) parameters:
p0+ =
1
2
(1 + 2Re 〈e0|e1〉) (23)
p1+ =
1
2
(1 + 2Re 〈e2|e3〉) (24)
pe1 =
1
2
− b(1− 2QZ) + 2
√
1
4
− b2Re 〈e1|e3〉 (25)
pe− = [from Equation 22]. (26)
Assuming η ≥ 0, then we may set B = η2 and thus compute our key rate
bound r from Equation 20. We will demonstrate how this may be done in the
next section when we consider a specific attack scenario. We will consider a
specific attack scenario so as to provide us with numbers to put to these many
variables so as to evaluate our key rate bound. However, in practice, these values
will be estimated from the observed statistics; our key rate bound derived in
this paper applies even in the most general of scenarios.
2.5 General Attacks
In the previous section we considered collective attacks (technically restricted
collective attacks, but these imply security against collective attacks for pro-
tocols of this type as proven in [12]). However, since the protocol is permuta-
tion invariant [20, 21], the results from [25, 26] apply and so to prove security
against general attacks, it is sufficient to show security against collective attacks.
Furthermore, our key rate bound, in the asymptotic scenario, holds true even
against arbitrary general attacks, thus giving us unconditional security.
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3 Evaluation
Our work in the preceding section applies to the most general case. Indeed, in
practice, A and B will estimate the parameters mentioned, determine a value
for η and, assuming the noise is small enough, use that value to compute r. In
the interest of evaluating our work in this paper, however, we will demonstrate
our key rate bound in a particular attack scenario. Namely, we will assume that
E’s reverse channel attack may be modeled by a depolarization channel with
parameter q. Such a channel acts on two-dimensional density operators ρ as
follows:
Eq(ρ) = (1− q)ρ+ q
2
I,
where I is the identity operator. Note a depolarization channel is the typical
scenario considered in the security proofs of B92 [23, 27].
From our work in the previous section, to compute a lower bound on the
key rate, we need to compute QZ , p0+, p1+, pe1, and pe− given bias b. We also
need qi,j for i, j ∈ {0, 1} (see Equation 8) which will give us pi,j and N .
The first three values are easily computed. Indeed, if B sends |i〉 for i ∈
{0, 1}, then the state arriving at A’s lab is:
Eq(|i〉 〈i|) = (1− q) |i〉 〈i|+ q
2
(|i〉 〈i|+ |1− i〉 〈1− i|), (27)
and so QZ = q/2 and:
p0+ = p1+ =
1− q
2
+
q
4
+
q
4
=
1
2
.
These last two imply that Re 〈e0|e1〉 = Re 〈e2|e3〉 = 0 (from Equations 23 and
24).
Next, we compute pe1. Let |e〉 =
√
1/2 + b |0〉+√1/2− b |1〉 as before and
let |e¯〉 be a normalized state such that 〈e¯|e〉 = 0. Under such conditions it is
trivial to show that 〈0|e¯〉 = √1/2− b and 〈1|e¯〉 = √1/2 + b. Then:
Eq(|e〉 〈e|) = (1− q) |e〉 〈e|+ q
2
(|e〉 〈e|+ |e¯〉 〈e¯|). (28)
From this it is clear that:
pe1 = (1− q)
(
1
2
− b
)
+
q
2
(
1
2
− b+ 1
2
+ b
)
=
1
2
− b(1− q) = 1
2
− b(1− 2QZ).
So long as b ∈ (−1/2, 1/2) (i.e., b 6= ±1/2), this implies, from Equation 25, that
Re 〈e1|e3〉 = 0.
Next, we consider pe− = Qe which is the probability that A measures |−〉 if
B reflects. In the absence of noise, this should be 0. From Equation 22 and the
above work, we have:
pe− = Qe = 〈g1|g1〉 = 1
2
−XY Re(〈e0|e3〉+ 〈e1|e2〉)
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which implies:
Re 〈e0|e3〉 = 1− 2Qe
2XY
−Re 〈e1|e2〉 = 1− 2Qe
2
√
1
4 − b2
−Re 〈e1|e2〉 .
By applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, as discussed in the previous section,
we have Re 〈e1|e2〉 ≤ QZ and so:
Re 〈e0|e3〉 ≥ 1− 2Qe
2
√
1
4 − b2
−QZ .
(Note that if there is no noise and no bias, then Re 〈e0|e3〉 = 1.)
Thus, we conclude that:
Re 〈h1|h0〉 = γRe 〈e0|e1〉 − γQZ + δRe 〈e0|e3〉 − δRe 〈e1|e3〉
= δRe 〈e0|e3〉 − γQZ
≥ √1− 2b
 1− 2Qe
2
√
1
4 − b2
−QZ
−QZ√1 + 2b = η.
So long as η ≥ 0, this may be used to bound | 〈h0|h1〉 |2 ≥ η2.
We now need to compute qi,j and Qe in terms of q. It is clear that q0,0 is the
probability that A measures |1〉 and B chooses to reflect (conditioning on the
event that B does not later discard this reflection iteration). From Equation
28, this quantity is:
q0,0 =
1
2
(
(1− q)
(
1
2
− b
)
+
q
2
)
=
1
2
(
1
2
− b(1− q)
)
.
Similarly, q1,1 is the probability that A measures |−〉 and B chooses to
measure and resend, conditioning on the event he measures (and thus sends)
|0〉. From Equation 27, this is found to be:
q1,1 =
1
2
(
1− q
2
+
q
2
)
=
1
4
.
The quantity q0,1 is the probability that A measures |1〉 and B chooses to
measure and resend, conditioning on the event he measures and sends |0〉. So:
q0,1 =
1
2
QZ =
q
4
.
Finally, q1,0 is the probability that A measures |−〉 and B chooses to reflect
(again conditioning on the event he does not discard this reflection iteration).
This is found to be:
q1,0 =
1
2
(
(1− q)
(
1
2
−
√
1
4
− b2
)
+
q
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Qe
=
1
2
Qe.
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This allows us to evaluate our key rate bound r. The reader will observe
that, though for this specific evaluation, we assumed a specific scenario of a
depolarization channel in the reverse direction, all parameters used to make the
necessary bounds are directly observable by A and B; indeed, they may even
enforce this particular scenario (as was the assumption in [23] when proving the
security of B92 and BB84).
A graph of the lower-bound r as a function of q for various levels of bias b is
shown in Figure 1. When b = 0, our key rate remains positive for all q ≤ .1072
(or QZ ≤ 5.36%). This is comparable to B92 which, given an optimal choice of
states, can tolerate up to 6.5% [27] (note that, if we were to alter the protocol
to use not X basis states, but an optimally chosen basis, as is done with B92
[23], we might be able to improve our key rate bound; we chose not to alter the
protocol, however, in this manner for this paper and security analysis). It is
also comparable to the three state BB84 which can withstand up to 5.1% error
[28].
Perhaps most surprisingly is the observation that for small negative bias
values (e.g., b = −0.1), while the key rate is worse for small values of q, it
actually remains positive slightly longer, for greater values of q. This is shown
more clearly in Figure 2 which shows a graph of the function:
τQ(b) = inf{q | r ≤ 0 given bias b},
as b varies (i.e., this figure depicts the maximally tolerated error rate, according
to our lower bound, as a function of the forward channel attack parameter b).
To better understand this, we consider the effects of the bias on certain
parameters. First, we observe that when b = −0.1, the error rate of A and
B’s raw key (that is, the value p0,1 + p1,0) is actually smaller for higher values
of q than the same value of q given bias b = 0. This is depicted in Figures 3
and 4. This is a small difference, however, since the quantity h(p0,1 + p1,0) =
h(p0,0 + p1,1) appears in our key rate expression of Equation 20, this difference
does contribute to the greater tolerated error rate for b = −0.1. The difference
between h(p0,0 + p1,1) for b = 0 and h(p0,0 + p1,1) when b = −0.1 is shown in
Figure 5. Finally, we observe that the value λ, in this particular scenario of a
depolarization channel, is greater for b = −0.1 than it is for b = 0 for large q.
The value of λ is shown in Figure 6.
Furthermore, consider B92, where A and B do not send |0〉 and |+〉 but
instead choose two nonorthogonal states; different choices lead to better or
worse performance. Similarly here, we may be able to improve the key rate of
our protocol even further by having A not measure in the X basis, but instead
measure in an optimally chosen, non Z basis (A would also send, not |+〉 but
instead one of the states in this optimally chosen basis). This could lead to
interesting future work. Note that our security analysis would apply even in
this case, though of course the algebra would only be slightly different. Of
course, the parameter b is in E’s control; clearly she would choose a positive
value for this quantity, decreasing the key rate while increasing her advantage.
It is an open question, consider the fact that E controls the forward channel, as
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Figure 1: A graph of our lower bound on the key rate of this SQKD protocol
as a function of the depolarization channel parameter q (note that, in this case,
QZ = q/2) for various levels of bias b. Note that, when b = 0, the key rate
remains positive for all q ≤ .1072 (i.e, QZ ≤ 5.36%). Note also that there are
certain levels of bias which are beneficial to A and B (namely negative biases up
to a certain amount). In particular, if b = −0.1, the protocol’s key rate remains
positive for all q ≤ .1118 (i.e., QZ ≤ 5.59%). See the text for a discussion of
this.
to how, if at all, an optimal choice of basis would alter the key rate expression
(as it does for B92).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a proof of unconditional security for a particular
semi-quantum key distribution protocol. We derived a lower bound on the key
rate of this protocol in the asymptotic scenario - our lower bound is a function
only of parameters that may be estimated by A and B. Finally, we evaluated
this bound in a particular example: the depolarization channel. This evaluation
showed that this SQKD protocol compares favorably to certain fully quantum
protocols. That is to say, this SQKD protocol’s maximally tolerated error rate of
5.36% (the error rate threshold which determines when A and B must abort) is
comparable to not only B92, but also the three state BB84 [4] as we mentioned in
the previous section. This is an observation we’ve made concerning other semi-
quantum cryptographic protocols [13, 16] yielding further evidence that, at least
in this perfect qubit scenario, semi-quantum protocols are comparable to fully
quantum ones. Naturally, leaving the perfect qubit scenario is a challenge - as it
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Figure 2: Showing maximum q for which our key rate bound remains positive
as b varies (said differently, the smallest q at which our bound becomes zero).
When b = 0, the rate remains positive for all q ≤ .1072. When b = −0.1, it
remains positive for all q ≤ .1118 (i.e., QZ ≤ 5.59%). When b ≥ .325, our key
rate bound is zero or negative for all q. See the text for a discussion of this.
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Figure 3: Showing a graph of the value p0,1 + p1,0, which is the error rate in A
and B’s raw key, as q increases for various levels of b. Note that b = 0 produces
the smallest such error except for large q when it actually produces more error
than when b = −0.1 (see also Figure 4). Positive values of b generally produce
the most error.
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Figure 4: A close up of the quantity p0,1 + p1,0 (the error rate in A and B’s
raw key) for larger q. Here it is more clear that there is a threshold after which
b = −0.1 actually produces less error than b = 0 (though the difference is slight,
it does contribute to the difference in key rate bounds for the two bias values).
This contributes to the fact that when the bias is small negative the protocol
can suffer a higher noise rate q.
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Figure 5: Here we write h(pW ; b = 0) to be the entropy h(p0,1 +p1,0) = h(p0,0 +
p1,1) when bias b = 0 is used. Similarly we define h(pW ; b = −0.1) to be the
same computation but when bias b = −0.1 is used. Observe that for larger q,
the entropy when b = 0 is larger than when b = −0.1. Since this entropy term is
subtracted from the key rate, this fact also contributes to the higher tolerated
error rate of b = −0.1 (when b = 0 we are subtracting a larger amount from r
for these higher values of q).
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Figure 6: A graph of the value λ (Equation 18) for various levels of bias b and
noise q. Note that when b = −0.1, λ is larger, thus S(EC) (which depends on
h(λ)) is smaller, thus increasing the key rate slightly.
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is with any fully quantum protocol - especially those quantum protocols utilizing
a two-way quantum channel. This problem we leave as important future work,
however we believe the proof techniques we develop here and in our prior work
can greatly aid in this effort. We also think, as mentioned before, our proof
techniques can find application outside the realm of semi-quantum protocols to
the proof of security for fully quantum protocols relying on two-way quantum
channels.
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